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Abstract
We study the expressive power of fragments of inclusion and independence logic defined either
by restricting the number of universal quantifiers or the arity of inclusion and independence atoms
in formulas. Assuming the so-called lax semantics for these logics, we relate these fragments of
inclusion and independence logic to familiar sublogics of existential second-order logic. We also
show that, with respect to the stronger strict semantics, inclusion logic is equivalent to existential
second-order logic.
1 Introduction
Independence logic [15] and inclusion logic [11] are recent variants of dependence logic. Dependence
logic [20] extends first-order logic by dependence atomic formulas
=(x1, . . . , xn) (1)
the meaning of which is that the value of xn is completely determined by the values of x1, . . . , xn−1.
The semantics of dependence logic is defined using sets of assignments rather than a single assignment
as in first-order logic. Independence logic replaces the dependence atoms by independence atoms ~y⊥~x~z,
the intuitive meaning of which is that, with respect to any fixed value of ~x, the variables ~y are totally
independent of the variables ~z. In inclusion logic dependence atoms are replaced by inclusion atoms
~x ⊆ ~y, meaning that all the values of ~x appear also as values for ~y. We study the expressive power of
the syntactic fragments of these logics defined either by restricting the number of universal quantifiers
or the arity of the independence and inclusion atoms in sentences. These results are proved with respect
to lax semantics. We also show that, under strict semantics, inclusion logic is equivalent to existential
second-order logic ESO while, by a recent result of Hella and Galliani [3], with lax semantics inclusion
logic is equivalent to greatest fixed point logic, and hence to LFP (and PTIME) over finite (ordered)
structures.
Since the introduction of dependence logic (D) in 2007 many interesting variants of it have been
introduced. In fact the team semantics of dependence logic has turned into a general framework for
logics in which various notions of dependence and independence can be formalized. Dependence logic
has a very intimate and well understood connection to ESO dating back to the results of [17, 8, 22]
on Henkin quantifiers. For some of the new variants and concepts in this area the correspondence to
∗The authors were supported by grant 264917 of the Academy of Finland.
†Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Helsinki, Finland. pgallian@gmail.com
‡Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Helsinki, Finland. miika.hannula@helsinki.fi
§Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Helsinki, Finland. juha.kontinen@helsinki.fi
1
ESO does not hold. We briefly mention some related work on the complexity theoretic aspects of these
logics:
• The extension of dependence logic by so-called intuitionistic implication → (introduced in [1])
increases the expressive power of dependence logic to full second-order logic [23].
• The model checking problem of full dependence logic, and many of its variants, was recently
shown to be NEXPTIME-complete. In fact, for any variant of dependence logic whose atoms
are PTIME-computable, the corresponding model checking problem is contained in NEXPTIME
[13].
• The non-classical interpretation of disjunction in dependence logic has the effect that the model
checking problems of φ1 := =(x, y)∨ =(u, v) and φ2 := =(x, y)∨ =(u, v)∨ =(u, v) are already
NL-complete and NP-complete, respectively [18].
While dependence logic and independence logic are both equivalent to ESO in expressive power [20,
15], for inclusion logic only containment in ESO has been shown [11]. Furthermore, the expressive
power of various natural syntactic fragments of independence and inclusion logics is not understood
at the moment. The starting point of our work were the results of [7] on the fragments D(k∀) and
D(k-dep) of dependence logic. The fragment D(k∀) contains those D-formulas in which at most k
variables have been universally quantified, and in the formulas of D(k-dep) dependence atoms of arity
at most k may appear (atoms of the form =(x1, . . . , xn) satisfying n ≤ k + 1). The following results
were shown in [7]:
1. D(k-dep) = ESOf (k-ary),
2. D(k∀) ≤ ESOf (k∀) ≤ D(2k∀)
where ESOf (k-ary) is the fragment of ESO in which the quantified functions and relations have arity
at most k, and ESOf (k∀) consists of ESO-sentences that are in Skolem Normal Form and contain at
most k universal first-order quantifiers. The equivalence in (1) was used to show that in D(k-dep) even
cardinality of a k + 1-ary relation cannot be expressed using the result of Ajtai [2]. On the other hand,
since
ESOf (k∀) = NTIMERAM(n
k) < NTIMERAM(n
k+1)
by [14] and [6], an infinite expressivity hierarchy for the fragments D(k∀) was shown using 2. Above
NTIMERAM(n
k) denotes the family of classes of τ -structures that can be recognized by a non-deterministic
RAM in time O(nk).
In [11] it was observed that independence logic and inclusion logic can be given two alternative
semantics called strict and lax semantics. For dependence logic these two semantics coincide in the
sense that the meaning of any D-formula is the same under both interpretations. For independence and
inclusion logic formulas this is not the case as shown in [11]. In fact, we will show that, with respect
to strict semantics, inclusion logic is equivalent to ESO, while by a recent result of Hella and Galliani
[3], with lax semantics inclusion logic is equivalent to greatest fixed point logic. In the rest of the
article we consider the expressive power of fragments of independence logic and inclusion logic with
lax semantics. First we look at fragments defined analogously to D(k-dep) of dependence logic. We let
FO(⊥c)(k-ind) contain those independence logic sentences in which independence atoms with at most
k+1 different variables may appear. Similarly in the sentences of FO(⊆)(k-inc) only inclusion atoms
of the form ~a ⊆ ~b, where |~a| = |~b| ≤ k may appear. Our results show that
FO(⊆)(k-inc) ≤ ESOf (k-ary) = FO(⊥c)(k-ind).
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Then we consider the analogoues ofD(k∀) in the case of FO(⊥) = FO(⊥c) [21], which is the sublogic
of independence logic allowing only so-called pure atoms ~y⊥~z, and FO(⊥,⊆). We show that
• FO(⊥)(2∀) = FO(⊥),
• FO(⊥,⊆)(1∀) = FO(⊥,⊆).
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic properties and results
regarding dependence logic and its variants. In Section 3 we compare the strict and lax semantics and
in Section 4.1 relate the arity fragments of independence logic and inclusion logic with that of ESO.
Finally, in Section 4.2 we consider fragments defined by restricting the number of universally quantified
variables.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Team Semantics
Team semantics is a generalization of Tarski semantics in which formulas are interpreted by sets of
assignments, called teams, rather than by single assignments. In this subsection, we will recall the
definition of team semantics for first order logic. We will assume that all our formulas are in negation
normal form. Also, all structures considered in the paper are assumed to have at least two elements.
Definition 2. Let M be a first-order model and V a finite set of variables. Then
• a team X overM with domain Dom(X) = V is a finite set of assignments from V to the domain
M of M;
• for a tuple ~v of variables in V , we write X(~v) for the set {s(~v) : s ∈ X} of all values that ~v
takes in X , where s(~v) := (s(v1), . . . , s(vn));
• for a subset W of V , we write X ↾ W for the team obtained by restricting all assignments of X
to the variables in W .
• For a formula φ, the set of free variables of φ is denoted by Fr(φ).
There exist two variants of team semantics, called respectively strict and lax, which differ with re-
spect to the interpretation of disjunction and existential quantification. Informally speaking, the choice
between strict and lax semantics corresponds to the choice between disallowing or allowing nondeter-
ministic strategies in the corresponding semantic games.1
We first give the definition of the lax version of team semantics; later, we will discuss some of the
ways in which strict semantics differs from it.
Definition 3 (Team Semantics). Let M be any first-order model and let X be any team over it. Then
TS-lit: For all first-order literals α, M |=X α if and only if, for all s ∈ X , M |=s α in the usual
Tarski semantics sense;
TS-∨: For all ψ and θ, M |=X ψ ∨ θ if and only if X = Y ∪ Z for two subteams Y and Z such that
M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ;
TS-∧: For all ψ and θ, M |=X ψ ∧ θ if and only if M |=X ψ and M |=X θ;
1See [10] and [13] for details.
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TS-∃: For all ψ and all variables v, M |=X ∃vψ if and only if there exists a function H : X →
P(M)\{∅} such that M |=X[H/v] ψ, where X [H/v] = {s[m/v] : s ∈ X,m ∈ H(s)};
TS-∀ : For all ψ and all variables v, M |=X ∀vψ if and only if M |=X[M/v] ψ, where X [M/v] =
{s[m/v] : s ∈ X,m ∈M}.
IfM |=X φ, we say thatX satisfies φ inM; and if a sentence (that is, a formula with no free variables)
φ is satisfied by the team {∅},2 we say that φ is true in M and we write M |= φ.
In the team semantics setting, formulas φ and ψ are said to be logically equivalent, φ ≡ ψ, if for all
models M and teams X , with Fr(φ) ∪ Fr(ψ) ⊆ Dom(X), M |=X φ ⇔M |=X ψ. Logics L and L′
are said to be equivalent, L = L′, if every L-sentence φ is equivalent to some L′-sentence ψ, and vice
versa.
The following result can be proved by structural induction on the formula φ:
Theorem 4 (Flatness). For all first order formulas φ and all suitable models M and teams X , the
following are equivalent:
1. M |=X φ;
2. For all s ∈ X , M |={s} φ;
3. For all s ∈ X , M |=s φ according to Tarski semantics.
2.2 Dependencies in Team Semantics
The advantage of team semantics, and the reason for its development, is that it allows us to extend first-
order logic by new atoms and operators. For the purposes of this paper, the following atoms, inspired
by database-theoretic dependency notions3, are of particular interest:
Definition 5. • Let ~x be a tuple of variables and let y be another variable. Then =(~x, y) is a
dependence atom, with the semantic rule
TS-dep: M |=X=(~x, y) if and only if any two s, s′ ∈ X which assign the same value to ~x also
assign the same value to y;
• Let ~x, ~y, and ~z be tuples of variables (not necessarily of the same length). Then ~y ⊥~x ~z is a
conditional independence atom, with the semantic rule
TS-ind: M |=X ~y ⊥~x ~z if and only if for any two s, s′ ∈ X which assign the same value to ~x
there exists a s′′ ∈ X which agrees with s with respect to ~x and ~y and with s′ with respect
to ~z.
Furthermore, we will write ~x ⊥ ~y as a shorthand for ~x ⊥∅ ~y, and call it a pure independence
atom;
• Let ~x and ~y be two tuples of variables of the same length. Then ~x ⊆ ~y is an inclusion atom, with
the semantic rule
2{∅} is the team containing the empty assignment. Of course, this is different from the empty team ∅, containing no assign-
ments.
3More precisely, dependence atoms correspond to functional dependencies [4], independence atoms to embedded multivalued
dependencies and conditional dependency conditions as in [12, 19], and inclusion atoms to inclusion dependencies [9, 5].
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TS-inc: M |=X ~x ⊆ ~y if and only if X(~x) ⊆ X(~y);
Given a collection C ⊆ {=(. . .),⊥c,⊆} of atoms, we will write FO(C) (omitting the set parenthesis
of C) for the logic obtained by adding them to the language of first-order logic. With this notation
dependence logic, independence logic and inclusion logic are denoted by FO(=(. . .)), FO(⊥c) and
FO(⊆), respectively. We will also write FO(⊥) for the fragment of independence logic containing
only pure independence atoms.
All formulas of all the above-mentioned logics satisfy the two following properties:
Proposition 6 (Empty Team Property). For all models M and φ ∈ FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆) over the signa-
ture of M, M |=∅ φ.
Proposition 7 (Locality). Let φ be a formula of FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆) whose free variables Fr(φ) are
contained in V . Then, for all models M and teams X , M |=X φ if and only if M |=X↾V φ.
Furthermore, we have the two following results for dependence logic:
Proposition 8 (Downwards Closure). For all models M, dependence logic formulas φ and teams X ,
if M |=X φ then M |=Y φ for all Y ⊆ X .
Theorem 9 ([22, 8, 20]). Any dependence logic sentence φ is logically equivalent to some ESO sen-
tence φ∗, and vice versa.
What about independence logic? As shown in [15], a dependence atom =(~x, y) is logically equiva-
lent to the independence atom y ⊥~x y, and, since independence logic is clearly contained in ESO, we
have at once that
Theorem 10 ([15]). Any independence logic sentence φ is logically equivalent to some ESO sentence
φ∗, and vice versa.
Furthermore,
Theorem 11 ([21]). Any independence logic formula is equivalent to some pure independence logic
formula.
For inclusion logic the following is known.
Theorem 12.
1. An inclusion atom ~x ⊆ ~y is equivalent to the FO(⊥) expression
∀v1v2~z((~z 6= ~x ∧ ~z 6= ~x) ∨ (v1 6= v2 ∧ ~z 6= ~y) ∨ ((v1 = v2 ∨ ~z = ~y) ∧ ~z ⊥ v1v2))
where v1, v2 and ~z are new variables [11].
2. Any inclusion logic sentence φ is logically equivalent to some positive greatest fixpoint logic
sentence φ∗, and vice versa [3].
We conclude this subsection with two novel results, a characterization of dependence in terms of
pure independence and a prenex normal form theorem for formulas of our logics.
Theorem 13. For all models M and teams X
M |=X=(~x, y)⇔M |=X ∀~z∃w((~z = ~x→ w = y) ∧ ~xy⊥~zw).
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Proof. Suppose first that M |=X=(~x, y). Then there exists a function f : M |~x| → M such that
f(s(~x)) = s(y) for all s ∈ X . Then for Y = X [M/~z], define the choice functionH : Y → P(M)\{∅}
so that
H(s) = {f(s(~z))}
for all s ∈ Y , and let Z = Y [H/w]. If we can verify that M |=Z ~z = ~x → w = y and that
M |=Z ~xy⊥~zw, the left-to-right direction of our proof is done. Now, if h ∈ Z then h(w) = f(h(~z))
and h(y) = f(h(~x)), and therefore M |=Z ~z = ~x → w = y. Furthermore, for h, h′ ∈ Z , we
have that h′′ = h[h′(~z)/~z][h′(w)/w] ∈ Z , since our choice of w depends only on ~z, and therefore
M |=Z ~xy⊥~zw.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a function H : X [M/~z] → P(M)\{∅} such that, for Z =
X [M/~z][H/w], M |=Z ~z = ~x→ w = y∧~xy⊥~zw. Now let s, s′ ∈ X be such that s(~x) = s′(~x) = ~m,
let a = s(y) and let b = s′(y): we need to prove that a = b.
Take h ∈ s[~m/~z][H/w] ⊆ Z: since M |=Z ~z = ~x→ w = y, we must have that h(w) = s(y) = a.
Similarly, for h′ ∈ s′[~m/~z][H/w] ⊆ Z , we must have that h′(w) = s′(y) = b. But M |=Z ~xy⊥~zw,
so there exists a h′′ ∈ Z such that h′′(~xy) = h(~xy) = ~ma and h′′(~zw) = h′(~zw) = ~mb. Since, again,
M |=Z ~z = ~x→ w = y, the only possibility is that a = b, as required.
Lemma 14. Let φ, ψ ∈ FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆) and let x be a variable not occurring free in ψ. Then the
following equivalences hold:
1. ∃xφ ∧ ψ ≡ ∃x(φ ∧ ψ),
2. ∃xφ ∨ ψ ≡ ∃x(φ ∨ ψ),
3. ∀xφ ∧ ψ ≡ ∀x(φ ∧ ψ),
4. ∀xφ ∨ ψ ≡ ∃a∃b∀x((φ ∧ a = b) ∨ (ψ ∧ a 6= b)) where a and b are new variables.
Proof. The cases 1, 2 and 3 are proved as in Lemma 12 in [16]. We prove number 4. By Proposition 7
it is enough to prove the equivalence for teams X with Dom(X) = Fr(∀xφ ∨ ψ).
Assume first that M |=X ∀xφ ∨ ψ and x does not occur free in ψ. Then there are Y ∪ Z = X
such that M |=Y [M/x] φ and M |=Z ψ. Let 0, 1 ∈ M be distinct. We extend each s ∈ X with a 7→ 0
and b 7→ 0, for s ∈ Y , and with a 7→ 0 and b 7→ 1, for s ∈ Z , and we let X ′ consist of these extended
assignments. So each s ∈ X has either one or two extensions in X ′. Let Y ′ := {s ∈ X ′[M/x] |
s(a) = s(b)} and Z ′ := {s ∈ X ′[M/x] | s(a) 6= s(b)}. Then by Proposition 7, M |=Y ′ φ ∧ a = b
and M |=Z′ ψ ∧ a 6= b. Hence M |=X′[M/x] (φ ∧ a = b) ∨ (ψ ∧ a 6= b), and we conclude that
M |=X ∃a∃b∀x((φ ∧ a = b) ∨ (ψ ∧ a 6= b)).
Assume then that M |=X ∃a∃b∀x((φ ∧ a = b) ∨ (ψ ∧ a 6= b)). Let Fa : X → P(M) and
Fb : X [Fa/a] → P(M) be such that if X ′ := X [Fa/a][Fb/b][M/x], then M |=X′ (φ ∧ a =
b) ∨ (ψ ∧ a 6= b). Let Y ′ ∪ Z ′ = X ′ be such that M |=Y ′ φ ∧ a = b and M |=Z′ ψ ∧ a 6= b. Let
Y := Y ′ ↾ Dom(X) and Z := Z ′ ↾ Dom(X). Then Y [M/x] = Y ′ ↾ (Dom(X) ∪ {x}), and thus by
Proposition 7 M |=Y [M/x] φ. Also by Proposition 7 M |=Z ψ. Since Y ∪ Z = X , we conclude that
M |= ∀xφ ∨ ψ.
Lemma 14 allows us to show the following.
Theorem 15. Any formula φ ∈ FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆) is logically equivalent to some formula φ′ such that
1. φ′ is of the form Q1x1 . . . Qkxkψ, where ψ is quantifier-free;
2. Any literal or non-first-order atom which occurs in φ′ occurred already in φ;
3. The number of universal quantifiers in φ′ is the same as the number of universal quantifiers in φ.
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3 Comparing strict and lax semantics
As we mentioned, there exists an alternative variant of lax semantics, called strict semantics. It differs
from lax semantics in the definition of the semantic rules for disjunction and existential quantification,
which are replaced respectively by
STS-∨: For all ψ and θ, M |=X ψ ∨ θ if and only if Y and Z exist such that Y ∪Z = X , Y ∩Z = ∅,
M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ;
STS-∃: For all ψ and all variables v, M |=X ∃vψ if and only if there exists a function F : X → M
such that M |=X[F/v] ψ, where X [F/v] = {s[F (s)/v] : s ∈ X}.
It is clear that
Proposition 16. IfM |=X φ according to strict team semantics, then M |=X φ according to lax team
semantics.
For downwards closed logics, such as dependence logic, the converse is also true.
Proposition 17 ([11]). For all dependence logic formulas φ, modelsM and teams X ,M |=X φ holds
wrt strict team semantics if and only if it holds wrt lax team semantics.
However, the same is false for both inclusion logic and independence logic. In particular, as we
will now see, inclusion logic with strict semantics is equivalent to full existential second order logic, in
contrast with the second item of Theorem 12.
By Theorem 9, it suffices to show that every dependence logic sentence is equivalent to some inclu-
sion logic sentence (with strict semantics). In order to do so, we will use the following normal form
theorem from [20]:
Theorem 18 ([20]). Every dependence logic sentence is equivalent to some sentence of the form
φ := ∀~x∃~y

∧
yi∈~y
=(~vi, ~yi) ∧ θ

 (19)
where for all i, ~vi is contained in ~x and where θ is a quantifier-free first-order formula.
As we will now show, in strict semantics the dependence atoms in (19) can be replaced by equivalent
inclusion logic subformulas; and, therefore, it follows at once that (strict) inclusion logic is equivalent
to dependence logic (and, therefore, to ESO) over sentences.
Definition 20. Let M be a model and X a team, and let ~x be a tuple of variables in its domain. We
say that X is ~x-universal if for all tuples of elements ~m with |~m| = |~x|, there exists one and only one
s ∈ X with s(~x) = ~m.
Lemma 21. If X is of the form {∅}[M/~x][~F/~y] then X is ~x-universal.
Proof. Obvious (but note that if the ~F were replaced by nondeterministic choice functions ~H, as in the
case of the lax semantics, this would not hold).
Proposition 22. Let M be a model and X a ~x-universal team. Suppose also that y 6∈ ~x, ~v ⊆ ~x, and
~w = ~x\~v (that is, ~w lists, without repetitions, all variables occurring in ~x but not in ~v). Then
M |=X=(~v, y)⇔M |=X ∀~q(~q~vy ⊆ ~w~vy).
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Proof. Suppose that M |=X=(~v, y), and let h = s[~m/~q] ∈ X [M/~q], where s ∈ X . Since X is
~x-universal and ~x = ~v ∪ ~w, there exists an assignment s′ ∈ X such that s′(~w) = ~m and s′(~v) = s(~v).
Since y is a function of ~v alone, this implies that s′(y) = s(y). Finally, h′ = s′[~m/~q] ∈ X [M/~q], and
h′(~w~vy) = ~ms(~vy) = h(~q~vy), as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X ∀~q(~q~vy ⊆ ~w~vy), and let s, s′ ∈ X be such that s(~v) = s′(~v).
Now let ~m = s′(~w), and consider h = s[~m/~q] ∈ X [M/~q]. By hypothesis, there exists a h′ ∈ X [M/~q]
such that h′(~w) = h(~q) = ~m and h′(~vy) = h(~vy) = s(~vy). This h′ is of the form s′′[ ~m′/~q] for some
s′′ ∈ X ; and for this s′′, we have that s′′(~v) = s(~v) = s′(~v), s′′(~w) = ~m = s′(~w) and s′′(y) = s(~y).
Now, ~x = ~v ∪ ~w, and s′′ coincides with s′ over it, and X is ~x-universal; therefore, we have to conclude
that s′′ = s′. But then s′(y) = s′′(y) = s(y), and therefore s′′ and s coincide over y too.
Corollary 23. With strict semantics inclusion logic is equivalent to ESO.
Proof. By Lemma 21 and the Proposition 22, any sentence of the form (19) can be expressed in inclu-
sion logic as
∀~x∃~y

∧
yi∈~y
(∀~qi(~qi~viy ⊆ ~wi~viy)) ∧ θ

 (24)
where for all i, ~wi = ~x\~vi; and this implies our result.
The analogue of Theorem 7 (locality) for inclusion logic with strict semantics fails. As an especially
surprising example of such an failure we now show that one can find inclusion logic sentences that count
the number of assignments in a team:
Theorem 25. For each natural number n there is a sentence φ ∈ FO(⊆) such that for all models M
and teams X where X 6= ∅ and the variables in Dom(X) do not appear in φ,
M |=X φ if and only if |X | ≥ n.
Proof. Let n be a natural number. We may assume that n ≥ 2 because in the case n = 1 we can just
choose φ := ⊤. Let ~xi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, list variables xi,0, . . . , xi,l where l =log(n). Let
φ := ∃~x0 . . .∃~xn−1(
∧
0≤i≤n−1
~xi ⊆ ~x0 ∧
∧
0≤i<j≤n−1
~xi 6= ~xj)
where
~xi 6= ~xj :=
∨
0≤k≤l
xi,k 6= xj,k.
Now φ is as wanted:
Assume first that M |=X φ. Then there are, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, functions
Fi : X [F0/~x0] . . . [Fi−1/~xi−1]→M
l+1
such that
M |=X′
∧
0≤i≤n−1
~xi ⊆ ~x0 ∧
∧
0≤i<j≤n−1
~xi 6= ~xj (26)
when X ′ := X [F0/~x0] . . . [Fn−1/~xn−1]. Let s ∈ X ′ be some arbitrary assignment. From (26) it
follows that X ′ must include assignments si, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, such that si(~x0) = s(~xi). Also from
(26) it follows that s(~xi) 6= s(~xj), for 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n − 1. Thus the assignments si are distinct and
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therefore |X ′| ≥ n. Because existential quantification of new variables in strict semantics preserves the
cardinality of a team we deduce that X ≥ n.
Suppose then X ≥ n. By the assumption n ≥ 2, and thus we may deduce that |M | ≥ 2. Let 0
and 1 be two different members of M , and let i be the binary representation (of length l + 1) of i, for
0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, in terms of these 0 and 1. Choose then n different assignments s0, . . . , sn−1 from X .
We define, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, Fi : X [F0/~x0] . . . [Fi−1/~xi−1]→M l+1 as follows:
Fi(s) :=
{
j + i if s ↾ Dom(X) = sj , for 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
i otherwise
where j + i is mod n. By the assumption, the variables in Dom(X) are not listed in ~x0 . . . ~xn−1, and
thus the functions Fi are consistent with the definition of existential quantification for strict semantics.
Without the assumption it could be the case that different si and sj would collapse into one assignment
in the quantification procedure. Let X ′ := X [F0/~x0] . . . [Fn−1/~xn−1]. Then sj , for 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, is
extended in X ′ to
sj(j/~x~0)(j + 1/~x1) . . . (j − 2/~xn−2)(j − 1/~xn−1),
and each t ∈ X \ {sj | 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1} is extended in X ′ analogously to s0. So for each s ∈ X ′ and
0 ≤ i < j ≤ n− 1 it holds that s(~xi) 6= s(~xj). Also
{s(~x0) | s ∈ X
′} = {i | 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1} =
⋃
0≤i≤n−1
{s(~xi) | s ∈ X
′},
and thus
M |=X′
∧
0≤i≤n−1
~xi ⊆ ~x0 ∧
∧
0≤i<j≤n−1
~xi 6= ~xj
which concludes the proof.
The failure of locality in non-downwards closed logics with strict semantics is somewhat problem-
atic, as it causes the interpretation of a formula to depend on the values that our assignments take on
variables which do not occur in it. As a consequence, in the rest of this work we will focus on logics
with lax semantics.
4 The expressive power of fragments
The purpose of this section is to generalize the classification of the expressive power of fragments of
dependence logic of [7] to the case of other variants (with respect to lax semantics). We will consider
the following fragments.
Definition 27. Let C be a subset of {=(. . .),⊥c,⊥,⊆} and let k ∈ N. Then
1. FO(C)(k−dep) is the class of sentences ofFO(C) in which dependence atoms of the form=(~z, y),
where ~z is of length at most k, may appear.
2. FO(C)(k−ind) is the class of sentences ofFO(C) in which independence atoms of the form ~y⊥~x~z,
where ~x~y~z has at most k + 1 distinct variables, may appear.
3. FO(C)(k−inc) is the class of sentences of FO(C) in which inclusion atoms of the form ~a ⊆ ~b,
where ~a and~b are of length at most k, may appear.
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4. FO(C)(k∀) is the class of sentences of FO(C) in which at most k universal quantifiers occur.
As in [7], we will write D(k-dep) and D(k∀) for FO(=(. . .))(k−dep) and FO(=(. . .))(k∀), re-
spectively.
4.1 Arity hierarchies
In this section we will prove that FO(⊥c)(k-ind) = ESOf (k-ary). In particular this also implies
that FO(⊥c)(k-ind) = D(k-dep) [7]. We will also prove that FO(⊆)(k-inc) ≤ ESOf (k-ary). The
direction from ESOf (k-ary) to FO(⊥c)(k-ind) is straightforward.
Proposition 28. ESOf (k-ary) ≤ FO(⊥c)(k-ind).
Proof. Let φ ∈ ESOf (k-ary). By [7] there exists a φ′ ∈ D(k-dep) equivalent to φ and of the form
Q1x1 . . . Q
mxm∃y1 . . . ∃yn(
∧
1≤j≤n
=(~zj , yj) ∧ θ)
where ~zj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, is a sequence of length at most k. By [15] each dependence atom =(~z, y) is
equivalent to the independence atom y⊥~z y. Therefore we can present φ′ in the following independence
logic form
Q1x1 . . . Q
mxm∃y1 . . .∃yn(
∧
1≤j≤n
yj⊥~zjyj ∧ θ)
where ~zjyj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, is a sequence of at most k + 1 different variables.
We will next show the other direction.
Lemma 29. Let~b⊥~a~c be an independence atom where ~a,~b and ~c are tuples of variables. If ~b0 lists the
variables in~b − ~a ∪ ~c, ~c0 lists the variables in ~c− ~a ∪~b, and ~d lists the variables in~b ∩ ~c− ~a, then
~b⊥~a~c ≡ ~b0⊥~a ~c0 ∧
∧
d∈~d
=(~a, d).
Proof. Assume that M |=X ~b⊥~a~c. Then clearly ~b0⊥~a ~c0. For
∧
d∈~d =(~a, d), let d ∈ ~d and s, s
′ ∈ X
be such that s(~a) = s′(~a). Then by the assumption there is s′′ ∈ X such that s′′(~a~b~c) = s(~a~b)s′(~c).
Because d is listed in both~b and ~c, it follows that s(d) = s′(d).
Suppose then M |=X ~b0⊥~a ~c0 ∧
∧
d∈~d =(~a, d). Let s, s
′ ∈ X be such that s(~a) = s′(~a). By the
assumption there is s′′ ∈ X such that s′′(~a~b0~c0) = s(~a~b0)s′(~c0). We want to show that s′′(~a~b~c) =
s(~a~b)s′(~c). Consider first variables x listed in ~b −~b0. If x is listed in ~a, then s′′(x) = s(x) as wanted.
Assume that x is listed in ~c− ~a. Then x ∈ ~d, and thus s′′(x) = s(x) follows from s′′(~a) = s(~a).
For variables x is listed in ~c − ~c0 the proof of s′′(x) = s′(x) is analogous because s(~a) = s′(~a).
This concludes the proof.
Now we can prove the following proposition. In the proof we will present a translation from inde-
pendence logic to ESO, where independence atoms are coded by relation variables preserving the arity
of the atoms. Note that the translation presented in [15] does not preserve this property.
Proposition 30. FO(⊥c)(k-ind) ≤ ESOf (k-ary).
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Proof. Let φ ∈ FO(⊥c)(k-ind). By Theorem 15 we may assume that φ is in prenex normal form
Q1x1 . . .Q
nxnθ where θ is a quantifier-free formula. By Lemma 29 we may assume that each indepen-
dence atom in θ is either of the form =(~z, y) or~b⊥~a~c where
• y is not listed in ~z,
• ~a,~b and ~c do not share any variables,
• |~z| ≤ k and |~a~b~c| ≤ k + 1.
Let us next consider the subformulas of θ. We will enumerate the subformulas of θ by θ~i where~i
is a binary sequence encoding the location of the subformula in θ. Let θλ := θ where λ is the empty
sequence. If θ~i is a conjunction (or a disjunction), then we denote its conjuncts (or the disjuncts) as θ~i0
and θ~i1. Now let S := {~i | θ~i is a subformula of θ}, and let D and I be the subsets of S consisting
of sequences~i for which θ~i is a dependence atom or an independence atom, respectively. Let ≤ be a
partial order in S where~i ≤ ~j if~i~k = ~j for some binary ~k. Then~i ≤ ~j if and only if θ~j is a subformula
of θ~i.
Next we will define a Φ ∈ ESOf (k-ary) equivalent to φ. First we define ϕ~i for each ~i ∈ S
inductively as follows:
• ϕ~i := θ~i if θ~i is a first-order atom,
• ϕ~i := S~i(~a
~b) ∧ T~i(~a~c) if θ~i is~b ⊥~a ~c,
• ϕ~i := f~i(~z) = y if θ~i is =(~z, y),
• ϕ~i := ϕ~i0 ∧ ϕ~i1 if θ~i is θ~i0 ∧ θ~i1,
• ϕ~i := ϕ~i0 ∨ ϕ~i1 if θ~i is θ~i0 ∨ θ~i1.
Now let ϕ := ϕλ. Then ϕ is a quantifier-free first-order formula sharing the structure of θ where
the dependence and independence atoms are interpreted using new function symbols f~i and relation
symbols S~i and T~i, respectively. Let ~z~i, for ~i ∈ I , list the variables in {x1, . . . , xn} \ Fr(θ˜i). In the
following, for example, ∃(S~i)~i∈I denotes the prefix ∃S~i1 . . .∃S~im where~i1, . . . ,~im enumerates I . So
let us define Φ as
∃(S~i)~i∈I(T~i)~i∈I(f~i)~i∈D(Q
1x1 . . . Q
nxnϕ ∧ Ω) (31)
where
Ω :=
∧
~i∈I
[∀~a~b~c(S~i(~a
~b) ∧ T~i(~a~c))→ ∃~z~i(
∧
~j≤~i
ϕ~j ∧Q
1x′1 . . . Q
nx′n(ϕ
′ ∧ χ))] (32)
where ϕ′ := ϕ(x′1/x1) . . . (x′n/xn) and
χ :=
∧
1≤k≤n
Qk=∃
(x1 = x
′
1 ∧ . . . ∧ xk−1 = x
′
k−1)→ xk = x
′
k. (33)
The idea behind Φ is that the relation variables S~i and T~i, for ~i ∈ I , encode a subteam X~i that
satisfies~b⊥~a ~c. ThenΩ will ensure that for each s, s′ ∈ X~i with s(~a) = s′(~a) there is s′′ corresponding
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to the values of ~a~b~c and ~z~i such that s′′(~a~b~c) = s(~a~b)s′(~b). The variables x′i and χ will ensure that
s′′ ∈ X~i. We will now prove that
M |= φ⇔M |= Φ.
Only if-part: Assume that M |= φ. Then there are functions
Fi : X [F1/x1] . . . [Fi−1/xi−1]→ P(M) \ {∅},
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that
M |=Y θ
when Y := {∅}[F1/x1] . . . [Fn/xn]. Note that Fi(s) =M if Qi = ∀.
Let us then construct teams Y~i, for~i ∈ S, such that M |=Y~i θ~i, as follows. Let Yλ := Y .
• Assume that M |=Y~i θ~i where θ~i = θ~i0 ∧ θ~i1. Then Y~i0 := Y~i and Y~i1 := Y~i.
• Assume that M |=Y~i θ~i where θ~i = θ~i0 ∨ θ~i1. Then choose Y~i0 ∪ Y~i1 = Y~i so that M |=Y~i0 θ~i0
and M |=Y~i1 θ~i1.
We then note that
M |=Y~i
~b ⊥~a ~c if θ~i is~b ⊥~a ~c, (34)
M |=Y~i=(~z, y) if θ~i is =(~z, y). (35)
Now, for θ~i of the form~b ⊥~a ~c, the interpretations of S~i and T~i will be the following:
SM~i := {s(~a
~b) | s ∈ Y~i},
TM~i := {s(~a~c) | s ∈ Y~i}.
For θ~i of the form =(~z, y) we interpret f~i as follows:
fM~i (~a) :=
{
b if s(~zy) = ~ab for some s ∈ Y~i,
0 otherwise
where 0 ∈ M is arbitrary. Now f~i is well defined by (35). Let then M∗ := (M, ~SM, ~TM, ~fM). We
will show that
M∗ |= Q1x1 . . . Q
nxnϕ ∧ Ω.
Consider the first conjunct. For each xi with Qi = ∃ we can choose a value for it so that the values of
x1, . . . , xi agree with some s ∈ Y . Thus it suffices to show that, for s ∈ Y ,
M∗ |=s ϕ.
Since ϕ is a first-order formula, by Theorem 4 it suffices to show that M∗ |=Y ϕ. This can be done
inductively: For each atomic ϕ~i, M∗ |=Y~i ϕ~i by the definitions. If M
∗ |=Y~i0 ϕ~i0 and M
∗ |=Y~i1 ϕ~i1,
and ϕ~i is either disjunction or conjunction of ϕ~i0 and ϕ~i1, then M∗ |=Y~i ϕ~i by the construction of Y~i.
This concludes the claim and thus the first conjunct part.
Next we will to show that M∗ |= Ω where Ω is the formula∧
~i∈I
[∀~a~b~c(S~i(~a
~b) ∧ T~i(~a~c))→ ∃~z~i(
∧
~j≤~i
ϕ~j ∧Q
1x′1 . . . Q
nx′n(ϕ
′ ∧ χ))].
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Let ~i ∈ I and assume that θ~i = ~b ⊥~a ~c. Let ~α~β~γ be such that ~α~β ∈ SM~i and ~α~γ ∈ T
M
~i
. Then
there are s, s′ ∈ Y~i such that s(~a~b) = ~α~β and s′(~a~c) = ~α~γ. By (34) we can choose s′′ ∈ Y~i such
that s′′(~a~b~c) = s(~a~b)s′(~c). Let us then choose the values for ~z~i according to s′′. Then all the values
of x1, . . . , xn agree with s′′. Now, since M∗ |=Y~j ϕ~j for all ~j, and s
′′ ∈ Y~j for ~j ≤ ~i, it follows by
Theorem 4
M∗ |=s′′
∧
~j≤~i
ϕ~j .
Now it suffices to show that
M∗ |=s′′ Q
1x′1 . . . Q
nx′n(ϕ
′ ∧ χ).
For each x′i with Qi = ∃ we choose a value for it so that, for some t ∈ Y , the values of x′1, . . . , x′i are
t(x1), . . . , t(xi). In particular, if the values of x′1, . . . , x′i−1 agree with s′′, then we choose x′i according
to s′′ also. Let s∗ be an extension of s′′ which is constructed according to these rules. Now using the
fact that M∗ |=t ϕ for all t ∈ Y , and the way s∗ was chosen, we get
M∗ |=s∗ ϕ
′ ∧ χ.
Hence M |= Φ. This concludes the only if-part.
If-part: Assume that M |= Φ. Then we can find interpretations ~SM, ~TM and ~fM such that
M∗ |= Q1x1 . . . Q
nxnϕ ∧ Ω
whenM∗ := (M, ~SM, ~TM, ~fM). Consider the usual semantic game for first-order logic where player
∃ plays the role of verifier and player ∀ plays the role of falsifier. Then there is a winning strategy for
player ∃ in the semantic game for Q1x1 . . . Qnxnϕ ∧ Ω over M∗. Let Y consist of assignments
s : {x1, . . . , xn} →M corresponding to every possible play of x1, . . . , xn where player ∃ follows her
winning strategy. Analogously, let Y ′ consist of assignments s : {x1, . . . , xn} → M that correspond
to every possible play of x′1, . . . , x′n where player ∃ follows her winning strategy. Let X := Y ∪ Y ′.
We will show that
M |=X θ.
We know that M∗ |=X ϕ. Let us now define X~i, for~i ∈ S, as follows. Recall that ϕλ = ϕ where
λ is the empty sequence. We also let Xλ := X .
• If M∗ |=X~i ϕ~i where ϕ~i = ϕ~i0 ∧ ϕ~i1, then we let X~i0 := X~i and X~i1 := X~i.
• If M∗ |=X~i ϕ~i where ϕ~i = ϕ~i0 ∨ ϕ~i1, then we let X~i0 := {s ∈ X~i | M
∗ |=s ϕ~i0} and
X~i1 := {s ∈ X~i | M
∗ |=s ϕ~i1}.
From the construction it follows that M∗ |=X~i ϕ~i, for ~i ∈ S, and that X~i0 ∪ X~i1 = X~i if ϕ~i is a
disjunction. We will now show that for each atomic θ~i, M |=X~i θ~i:
1. If θ~i is a first-order atom, then the claim follows from θ~i = ϕ~i.
2. If θ~i is =(~z, y), then the claim follows from M∗ |=X~i f~i(~z) = y.
3. Assume that θ~i is ~b ⊥~a ~c. Then M∗ |=X~i S~i(~a~b) ∧ T~i(~a~c). Let s, s
′ ∈ X~i be such that s(~a) =
s′(~a). We have to show that there is s′′ ∈ X~i such that s′′(~a~b~c) = s(~a)s(~b)s′(~c). Now M∗ |= Ω,
so consider a play in the semantic game where player ∀ chooses first the conjunct with index ~i
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from Ω, and then chooses s(~a)s(~b)s′(~c) as values for ~a~b~c. Since s(~a)s(~b) ∈ SM~i and s(~a)s
′(~c) ∈
TM~i , then player ∃ plays according to her strategy and chooses values for ~z~i so that
M∗ |=s′′
∧
~j≤~i
ϕ~j ∧Q
1x′1 . . . Q
nx′n(ϕ
′ ∧ χ)
where s′′ is the assignment agreeing with the chosen values for ~a~b~c and ~z~i. Now we let player ∀
play each x′i with Qi = ∀ as s′′(xi). Then because of χ (defined in (33)) player ∃ must also play
each x′i with Qi = ∃ as s′′(xi). Hence s′′ corresponds to a play of x′1, . . . , x′n, and thus s′′ ∈ X .
Since M∗ |=s′′
∧
~j≤~i ϕ~j , it is a straightforward induction to show that s′′ ∈ X~i. This concludes
the step 3.
Now using the previous, a straightforward backward induction shows that M |=X θ. It then suffices to
show that there are functions
Fi : {∅}[F1/x1] . . . [Fi−1/xi−1]→ P(M) \ {∅}
such that Fi(s) =M if Qi = ∀, and that
X = {∅}[F1/x1] . . . [Fn/xn].
We define these functions inductively so that {∅}[F1/x1] . . . [Fi/xi] = X ↾ {x1, . . . , xi}, for 1 ≤ i ≤
n. Assume that we have defined F1, . . . , Fi successfully. We will define Fi+1 as wanted. Assume first
that Qi+1 = ∃. Then for s ∈ {∅}[F1/x1] . . . [Fi/xi], we let
Fi+1(s) = {t(xi+1) | t ∈ X, t ↾ {x1, . . . , xi} = s}.
By the induction assumption Fi+1(s) is non-empty, though it may not be singleton in case there are
multiple plays where values of x1, . . . , xi (or x′1, . . . , x′i) agree with s. We note that
{∅}[F1/x1] . . . [Fi+1/xi+1] = X ↾ {x1, . . . , xi+1}.
Assume then that Qi+1 = ∀. For s ∈ {∅}[F1/x1] . . . [Fi/xi], we let Fi+1(s) = P(M) and note
that
X ↾ {x1, . . . , xi+1} ⊆ {∅}[F1/x1] . . . [Fi+1/xi+1].
For the other direction, assume that s ∈ {∅}[F1/x1] . . . [Fi/xi] and let a ∈ M . We show that
s(a/x) ∈ X ↾ {x1, . . . , xi+1}. By the induction assumption s ∈ X ↾ {x1, . . . , xi}, and thus there is
a play of x1, . . . , xn (or x′1, . . . , x′n) that agrees with s in the first i variables. Let s′ be the assignment
corresponding to this play. Now instead of choosing s′(xi+1) (or s′(x′i+1)) at move i+ 1, player ∀ can
choose a for xi+1 (or for x′i+1). Let t be an assignment that corresponds to some play with these moves
for the first i+1 variables. Then t ∈ X and t ↾ {x1, . . . , xi+1} = s(a/xi+1). This concludes the proof,
and thus also the only if-part.
Note that inΦ each function or relation variable has an arity at most k. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 36. ESOf (k-ary) = FO(⊥c)(k-ind).
Proof. Follows from Propositions 28 and 30.
This gives us immediately a corollary regarding inclusion logic. Recall that FO(⊆)(k-inc) denotes
the class of inclusion logic sentences in which inclusion atoms of width at most k (i.e. atoms of the
form ~a ⊆ ~b where |~a| = |~b| ≤ k) may appear.
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Theorem 37. Assume k ≥ 2. Then FO(⊆)(k-inc) ≤ ESOf (k-ary).
Proof. Using item 1 of Theorem 12, we first translate inclusion logic sentences to independence logic,
and then apply Proposition 30. It is easy to check that this translation takes us to ESOf (k′-ary), where
k′ = max{k, 2}.
There is no hope of proving the other direction, since, e.g., even cardinality cannot be expressed in
FO(⊆) [3], but it is expressible inESOf (1-ary). Next we will show thatESOf (k-ary) ≤ FO(⊥)(2k + 2-ind).
Theorem 38. ESOf (k-ary) ≤ FO(⊥)(2k + 1-ind) ≤ ESOf (2k + 1-ary).
Proof. For the first inequality, note thatESOf (k-ary) = D(k-dep) by [7], andD(k-dep) ≤ FO(⊥)(2k + 1-ind)
by Theorem 13. The second inequality follows from Theorem 36.
4.2 ∀-hierarchies
In this section, we will examine the fragments FO(C)(k∀). We will prove that, contrary to the case of
the fragmentsD(k∀) [7], the following holds:
1. If {⊥,⊆} ⊆ C then the hierarchy collapses at level 1: FO(C) = FO(C)(1∀);
2. If ⊥ ∈ C then it collapses at level 2: FO(C) = FO(C)(2∀).
We will use the following result from [21]:
Proposition 39. Let φ be aFO(⊥) sentence. Then φ is equivalent to an formula of the form ∀~x∃~y(θ∧χ),
where θ is a conjunction of pure independence atoms and χ is first-order and quantifier-free.
Since, as we saw in the Preliminaries, we can define inclusion atoms and conditional independence
atoms in terms of pure independence atoms, it follows at once that any sentence of FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆)
is equivalent to some sentence of the above form.
Using this, we will prove that
Theorem 40. FO(⊥,⊆)(1∀) = FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆).
Proof. Let φ ∈ FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆). We will show that there exists a φ′ ∈ FO(⊥,⊆)(1∀) equivalent to
it. As we said, we can assume that φ is of the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xm∃xm+1 . . . ∃xm+n(θ ∧ χ), where θ is a
conjunction of pure independence atoms and χ is first-order and quantifier-free. Let us then define φ′
as
∀x1∃x2 . . . ∃xm∃xm+1 . . .∃xm+n(
∧
2≤i≤m
(x1 ⊆ xi ∧ x1 . . . xi−1⊥xi) ∧ θ ∧ χ).
We claim that φ′ is equivalent to φ. Assume first thatM |= φ. Then there are, for m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ n,
functions
Fi : {∅}[M/x1] . . . [M/xn][Fm+1/xm+1] . . . [Fi−1/xi−1]→ P(M) \ {∅}
such that M |=X θ ∧ χ when X := [M/x1] . . . [M/xn][Fm+1/xm+1] . . . [Fm+n/xm+n]. Let Fi, for
2 ≤ i ≤ m, be the constant function mapping each assignment to M . Then
X = {∅}[M/x1][F2/x2] . . . [Fm+n/xm+n].
Clearly M |=X
∧
2≤i≤m(x1 ⊆ xi ∧ x1 . . . xi−1⊥xi), and hence M |= φ′.
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For the other direction, assume that M |= φ′. Then there are, for 2 ≤ i ≤ m+ n, functions
Fi : {∅}[M/x1][F2/x2] . . . [Fi−1/xi−1]→ P(M) \ {∅}
such thatM |=X
∧
2≤i≤m(x1 ⊆ xi∧x1 . . . xi−1⊥xi)whenX := {∅}[M/x1][F2/x2] . . . [Fm+n/xm+n].
Define, for 2 ≤ i ≤ m, Xi := {∅}[M/x1][F2/x2] . . . [Fi/xi] and Yi := {∅}[M/x1][M/x2] . . . [M/xi].
It suffices to show that Xi = Yi for 2 ≤ i ≤ m.
First let us prove the claim for i = 2. Let s ∈ Y2. It suffices to show that s ∈ X2. By Proposition
7, M |=X2 x1 ⊆ x2 ∧ x1⊥x2. Let s′ ∈ X2 be such that s′(x1) = s(x2). Since M |=X2 x1 ⊆ x2, we
can find a t ∈ X2 such that t(x2) = s′(x1). Now let t′ ∈ X2 be such that t′(x1) = s(x1). Because
M |=X2 x1⊥x2, we can find a t′′ ∈ X2 such that t′′(x1) = t′(x1) and t′′(x2) = t(x2). Then t′′ = s
which concludes the claim for i = 2.
The induction step is proved analogously. This concludes the claim and the proof.
Let us now prove our second claim.
Theorem 41. FO(⊥)(2∀) = FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆).
Proof. Let φ ∈ FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆). Again, we can assume that φ is of the form ∀~xψ, where ~x =
x1 . . . xn and ψ is of the form ∃~yθ for θ quantifier-free and in FO(⊥). Let now p, q be two variables
not occurring in φ. We state that φ is equivalent to
φ∗ = ∀p∀q∃~x
((
p = q →
n∧
i=1
xi = p
)
∧
n−1∧
i=1
(x1 . . . xi⊥xi+1) ∧ ψ
)
.
Indeed, let M be a model and X = {∅}[M/p][M/q], and let the tuple of (nondeterministic) choice
functions ~U for ~x be such that
~U(s) =
{
(m, . . . ,m) if s(p) = s(q) = m;
Mn otherwise
and let Y = X [~U/~x]. It is obvious that M |=Y (p = q →
∧n
i=1 xi = p); and M |=Y ψ, because
Y (~x) = Mn and p, q do not occur in ψ. Finally, it is also true that Y satisfies all independence
atoms x1 . . . xi⊥xi+1, since Y (x1 . . . xixi+1) =M i+1 (assuming that our model contains two distinct
elements). ThereforeM |= φ∗, as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |= φ∗: then there exists a ~U such that, for Y = {∅}[M/pq][~U/~x],
M |=Y (p = q →
∧n
i=1 xi = p)∧
∧n−1
i=1 (x1 . . . xi⊥xi+1)∧ψ. We will show that Y (x1 . . . xn) is Mn,
that is, that all possible tuples m1 . . .mn of elements of our models are possible values for x1 . . . xn in
Y .
First of all, let us observe that for all m ∈ M there exists a hm ∈ Y such that hm(xi) = m
for all i. Indeed, we can find a sm ∈ X such that sm(p) = sm(q) = m and then pick an arbitrary
hm ∈ sm[~U/~x] ⊆ Y . Since M |=Y p = q →
∧
i xi = p, we have at once that hm(xi) = hm(p) = m,
as required.
Now we prove, by induction on i = 1 . . . n, that there exists a hi ∈ Y such that hi(x1 . . . xi) =
m1 . . .mi.
Base Case: Let h1 be hm1 ∈ Y . Then hm1(x1) = m1, as required.
Induction Case: Suppose that hi(x1 . . . xi) = m1 . . .mi, and consider hmi+1 . As we saw, hmi+1 ∈ Y
and hmi+1(xi+1) = mi+1. But M |=Y x1 . . . xi⊥xi+1; and therefore there exists a hi+1 ∈ Y
with hi+1(x1 . . . xi) = hi(x1 . . . xi) = m1 . . .mi and hi+1(xi+1) = hmi+1(xi+1) = mi+1.
Hence, hi+1(x1 . . . xi+1) = m1 . . .mi+1.
16
In particular, this implies that hn(x1 . . . xn) = m1 . . .mn; and since we started from an arbitrary
choice of m1 . . .mn, we can conclude that Y (~x) =M |~x|. But then the restriction of Y to ~x is precisely
{∅}[M/~x]; and since M |=Y ψ, by locality we have that M |= ∀~xψ, as required.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the expressive power of fragments of inclusion and independence logic
obtained by restricting the arity of non first-order atoms or the number of universal quantifiers. For the
first kind of restriction, we adapted and extended the hierarchy theorems of [7] to this new setting; but
for the second kind of restriction, we showed that the hierarchy collapses at a very low level if our logic
contains at least pure independence atoms.
A question which is still open is whether the fragments FO(⊆)(k∀) of inclusion logic give rise to
an infinite expressivity hierarchy. Another issue that requires further investigation is to which degree
our results can be adapted to the case of strict semantics. The exact nature of the relationship between
strict and lax semantics is a matter which is of no small interest for the further development of the area,
and a comparison of the properties of our fragments in these two settings might prove itself of great
value.
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